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JURISDICTION 
The trial court had jurisdiction over this mater pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated §78-3-4(1). This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(2)(j). The Judgment was entered by the 
trial court on December 27, 2006. Alan Jenkins Trustee's Notice of Appeal 
was filed on January 16, 2007, pursuant to Rule 4(a), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
APPELLANT ISSUE NO. 1: Did the trial court err when it denied 
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment? 
Standard of Review: A motion for summary judgment is appropriate 
only when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court must view all facts and 
inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, but it may not 
assume facts for which no evidence is offered. The appellate court reviews 
the trial court's ruling for correctness. Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c); Peterson v. 
Coco-Cola USA. 2002 Utah 42, 48 P.3d 941; Krantz v. Holt. 819 P. 2d 352, 
(Utah 1991). 
APPELLANT ISSUE NO. 2: Did the trial court err when it denied 
Appellant's Motion to Amend his Answer to include additional Statutes of 
Limitations as defenses? 
1 
Standard of Review: Once responsive pleadings have been filed, a 
party may amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of 
the adverse party, and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. 
Utah R. Civ. P. 15(a). The standard of review of a denial to amend pleadings 
is abuse of discretion. Kasco Serv. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P. 2d 86 (Utah 
1992). 
APPELLANT ISSUE NO. 3: Did the trial court err in refusing to give 
jury instructions requested by Defendant? 
Standard of Review: It is the duty of the trial court to cover the theories 
of both parties in its instructions. Because jury instructions are statements of 
the law, the standard of review for challenges to jury instructions is one of 
correctness. Startin v. Madsen, 120 Utah 631, 237 P. 2d 834 (1951); Green v. 
Louder, 2001 Utah 62, 29 P. 3d 638. 
PRESERVATION OF ISSUES FOR APPEAL: Defendant raised the 
foregoing issues in his Motion for Summary Judgment (R. at 56), his Motion 
to Amend Pleadings (R. at 244) and Defendant's proposed jury instructions 
(R. at 297-315) and counsel's stated objections to the jury instructions on the 
record (R. at 386, pages 536-541). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
A. Statutes: 
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U.C.A. §57-1-3. A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass 
by a conveyance of real estate, unless it appears from the conveyance that a 
lesser estate was intended. 
B. Rules: 
Rule 15(a), U.R.C.P. A party may amend his pleadings once as a 
matter of course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the 
pleading is one to which no responsive Pleading is permitted and the action 
has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time 
within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading 
only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave 
shall be freely given when justice so requires. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case: 
This case concerns the ownership of residential real property located at 
1074 North Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah. By Warranty Deed dated 
November 21, 1986, the real property in question was transferred from D. 
Gordon Berg to D. U. Company, a Utah corporation. A few months later, 
Sam and Elaine Jenkins moved onto the property. D. U. Co. claimed to be the 
owner of the property and the landlord of the Jenkins as tenants under a 
rental agreement. In 1997, Sam and Elaine Jenkins were divorced and signed 
a Stipulation that was filed in the divorce action, stating that except for a 
home in Burley, Idaho, they had acquired no other real property during the 
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course of their marriage. The disclaimer language from the Stipulation was 
incorporated into and made a part of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law and the Decree of Divorce filed in that action. A few weeks after the 
divorce action became final, Sam Jenkins was killed in an industrial accident. 
During the period of time the property was occupied by the Jenkins 
family, D. U. Co., Inc. collected rent from Sam and Elaine, until the death of 
Sam Jenkins. Thereafter, the rent was paid by Alan Jenkins, Sam's brother. 
While the Jenkins occupied the property, D. U. Co. received several notices 
from local health agencies complaining about the condition of the property 
and threatening to assess fines against D. U. Co. as the property owner, unless 
the health and safety violations were corrected. After Sam Jenkins' death, D. 
U. Co. threatened to evict Elaine and her children from the property, as Elaine 
refused to maintain the property, refused to sign a new lease agreement and 
refused to pay any rent. In order to avoid having the Jenkins family evicted, 
Alan Jenkins began paying the rent to D. U. Co. 
In January 2005, because of the continuing complaints from the Salt 
Lake City and County health departments, D. U. Co. informed Alan Jenkins 
that because Elaine would not maintain the property, it would have to evict 
her and her family, to avoid the threatened fines. Alan Jenkins purchased the 
property from D. U. Co. in an attempt to avoid having Elaine evicted from the 
property. After the purchase, Alan Jenkins was unsuccessful in his attempts 
to work with Elaine to complete the needed repairs of the property and after 
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receiving additional demands from the City and County health departments 
that he complete the repairs or face substantial fines, he determined that the 
only way to get the repairs completed would be to move Elaine and her 
children from the property so that the repairs could be made. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
On February 11, 2005, Alan Jenkins served Elaine Jenkins and her adult 
children, Loren, Stanley and Jeremiah Jenkins, with a notice that their tenancy 
of the property would terminate at the end of the current month. After 
receiving the notice, on February 18, 2005, Elaine Jenkins filed a Complaint 
against Alan Jenkins Trustee, contending that she and her ex-husband, Sam, 
were not tenants, but were the owners of the property (Case #050903391). 
On February 25, 2005, Elaine Jenkins filed an Amended Complaint. On 
March 1, 2008, before being served in case #050903391 and being unaware 
of that lawsuit, Alan Jenkins, Trustee, filed a Complaint, alleging unlawful 
detainer against Elaine, Loren, Stanley and Jeremiah Jenkins, seeking to 
recover possession of the property, so that he could complete the needed 
repairs (Case #050904099). On March 8, 2005, Elaine, Loren, Stanley and 
Jeremiah moved to consolidate case #050904099 with case #050903391. The 
District Court granted the Motion. On March 14, 2005, Alan Jenkins, Trustee 
moved the Court for an expedited trial setting on his Complaint in unlawful 
detainer. The Court denied the Motion. On June 23, 2005, Elaine Jenkins 
moved to file a Second Amended Complaint, adding D. U. Company, Inc. and 
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Davis County Co-operative Society, Inc. as defendants. The trial court 
granted the Motion. On August 4, 2005, Alan Jenkins moved for Summary 
Judgment. The District Court denied the Motion. On October 25, 2005, 
Defendant D. U. Company filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint against 
D. U. Company. The District Court granted the Motion, dismissing Elaine 
Jenkins' Complaint against D. U. Company. On June 26, 2006, Defendants 
Alan Jenkins, Trustee and Davis County Co-operative moved to amend their 
Answer to include additional statute of limitations defenses, particularly 
U.C.A. §§78-12-25 and 78-12-26. The District Court denied the Motion. 
C. Disposition in Trial Court 
The case was tried to a jury on October 11,12 and 13, 2006. The jury 
found in favor of Elaine Jenkins, ruling that the property belonged to Elaine 
and the estate of her ex-husband, Sam, even though Sam was not and never 
had been a party to the action. 
D. Statement of Facts 
1. On November 21, 1986, D. U. Company, Inc. purchased the property 
located at 1074 North Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah from Gordon 
Berg and received a warranty deed for the property. (R. at 385, p. 212; Ex. D-
12). 
2. Shortly after the purchase of the property, Sam and Elaine Jenkins 
moved onto the property. (R. at 385, p. 213). 
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3. D. U. company, Inc. maintained a rent ledger for the subject 
property, indicating that rent of $250.00 per month was received for the 
property. (Ex. D-36). 
4. Sam and Elaine Jenkins were divorced on August 6, 1977. In the 
divorce action, the parties, their attorneys, the guardian ad litem for Sam's and 
Elaine's minor children and a representative from the Utah Attorney 
General's office, all executed a Stipulation, and the attorneys representing the 
parties executed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Decree of 
Divorce, each of which contained the following language: (Ex's D-9, D-43, 
D-44). 
10. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired certain 
real property in Rupert, Idaho. Immediately upon entry of the divorce 
decree, defendant shall deliver to plaintiff a properly executed deed 
quit-claiming to plaintiff defendant's interest in the real property in 
lieu of alimony. 
11. The parties acquired no other real property during the course of 
the marriage. 
5. Shortly after Sam and Elaine were divorced, Sam Jenkins was killed 
in an industrial accident. (R. at 384, p. 72). 
6. After the divorce, Alan Jenkins began paying D. U. Co. rent on the 
subject property for the benefit of Elaine Jenkins and her children. (R. at 385, 
p. 240; R. at 386, p. 405; Ex. D-17 ) 
7. During the time the property was occupied by the Jenkins family, D. 
U. Company received several notices from the Salt Lake Valley Health 
7 
Department, advising of health and safety violations existing on the property 
and threatening to fine D. U. Co. as the property owner, unless the violations 
were abated. (Ex's D-18, D-25, D-26, D-27, D-28, D-29, D-30, D-32, D-33). 
8. On February 6, 2005, Alan Jenkins purchased the subject property 
from D. U. Company (Ex. D-13), paying $126,347.75 for the property. (Ex. 
D-15). 
9. On February 7, 2005, Alan Jenkins transferred the subject property 
to the Alan Jenkins Trust. (Ex. D-14). 
10. On February 11, 2005, Alan Jenkins served Elaine Jenkins, and her 
adult children Loren Jenkins, Stanley Jenkins and Jeremiah Jenkins, with a 
Notice to Quit, requiring them to vacate the subject property, so that Alan 
could make the repairs required by the Salt Lake Valley Health Department. 
(R. at 385, p. 248, 249; Ex. D-19). 
11. On February 18, 2005, Elaine Jenkins filed a Complaint in these 
consolidated actions. (R. at 1-7). 
12. On March 1, 2005, Alan Jenkins filed a Complaint in these 
consolidated actions, as Elaine Jenkins and her children refused to vacate the 
premises. (R. at 1-9, case #050904099) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court erred in denying Alan Jenkins' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, as Elaine Jenkins' claims to the subject property were barred by 
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statute and the issue of Elaine and Sam Jenkins' lack of ownership of the 
subject property had already been determined in a previous court proceeding. 
2. The trial court erred in denying the motion of Alan Jenkins and 
Davis County Co-operative Society, Inc. to amend their answer to Elaine 
Jenkins' Second Amended Complaint, to include additional statute of 
limitations defenses. The defenses were valid, would not have prejudiced Ms. 
Jenkins and the motion should have been granted in the interest of justice. 
3. The court erred in failing to give certain requested jury instructions 
of Alan Jenkins. By failing to give the requested instructions, the trial court 
failed to allow the jury to consider Alan Jenkins' theory of the case. 
ARGUMENT 
1. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ALAN JENKINS5 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Rule 56, U.R.C.P. provides that a party may move for summary 
judgment at any time after the expiration of twenty days from the 
commencement of the action, and that 
[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, 
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material 
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of 
law. 
Defendant Alan Jenkins filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on 
August 4, 2005. After briefing and oral argument, the court denied the 
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Motion. Based upon the law and the pleadings, Alan Jenkins submits that the 
trial court erred. 
A. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS TO OWNERSHIP OF THE PROPERTY 
ARE BARRED BY U.C.A. 25-5-1, 25-5-3 and/or 57-1-3. 
U.C.A. 25-5-1 provides, 
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not 
exceeding one year, nor any trust or power over or concerning real 
property or in any manner relating thereto, shall be created, granted, 
assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation of 
law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party 
creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by 
his lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing. 
U.C.A. 25-5-3 provides, 
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for 
the sale, of any land, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the 
contract or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing 
subscribed by the party by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or 
by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
U.C.A. 57-1-3 provides, 
A fee simple title is presumed to be intended to pass by a conveyance 
Of real estate, unless it appears from the conveyance that a lesser 
estate was intended. 
Elaine Jenkins alleged in her Complaint that she was the owner of the 
subject property. However, she produced no written document subscribed by 
Gordon Berg, D. U. Company, Alan Jenkins, or any other person or entity, 
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring that she had any interest, other 
than as a tenant, of the subject property. 
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Plaintiff asserted that her claims were not barred by the statute of frauds 
because of the "full or partial performance" exception to the statute. However, 
before that exception applies, there must be a showing of an agreement or 
contract to be performed. Plaintiff did not allege or show that such an 
agreement or contract existed, let alone with whom such an agreement was 
made, the terms of any such agreement to be performed, or when her 
performance was completed. Her Amended Complaint simply alleged that she 
owned the property from the time D. U. Company purchased it in 1988. 
In discussing the doctrine of full or partial performance as being an 
exception to the statute of frauds, our Supreme Court ruled in Ravarino v. 
Price. 123 Utah 559, 260 P.2d 570 (1953) at page 574, 
The doctrine is to be applied with great care, paying particular 
attention to the policy expressed in the statute of frauds and historical 
precedent where the limits have been defined by the process of 
inclusion and exclusion. In Price v. Lloyd, (citation omitted), this court 
said: "Courts of equity, in establishing the doctrine invoked by 
plaintiff, have not, by any means, intended to annul the statute of 
frauds, but only to prevent its being made the means of perpetrating a 
fraud. In order that a plaintiff may be permitted to give evidence of a 
contract not in writing, and which is in the very teeth of the statute and 
a nullity at law, it is essential that he establish [in equity], by clear and 
positive proof, acts and things done in pursuance and on account 
thereof, exclusively referable thereto, and which take it out of the 
operation of the statute". 
The only "clear and positive proof offered by Elaine Jenkins that she 
had any interest in the property, was that she was in possession of the property. 
Where the evidence was at least conflicting that her possession was as a tenant, 
not as an owner, her possession did not evidence acts and things done 
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exclusively in pursuance and on account of any agreement that she is or would 
become the owner of the property, sufficient to avoid the statute of frauds. Her 
possession is simply consistent with the fact that she occupied the property as a 
tenant, not as owner. 
The Court in the Ravarino case cited above, quoted with approval, the 
following language discussing the statute of frauds, from the case of Burns v. 
McCormick, 233 N.Y. 230, 135 N.E. 273, 274 (1922), 
The peril of perjury and error is latent in the spoken promise. Such, at 
least, is the warning of the statute, the estimate of policy that finds 
expression in its mandate. Equity, in assuming what is in substance a 
dispensing power, does not treat the statute as irrelevant, nor ignore the 
warning altogether. It declines to act on words, though the legal 
remedy is imperfect, unless the words are confirmed and illuminated by 
deeds. A power of dispensation, departing from the letter in supposed 
adherence to the spirit, involves an assumption of jurisdiction easily 
abused, and justified only within the limits imposed by history and 
precedent. The power is not exercised unless the policy of the law is 
saved. 
B. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF 
JUDICIAL ESTOPPAL 
As stated in the case of Condas v Condas, 618 P.2d 491 (Utah 1980), 
"[J]udicial estoppel prevents a party from seeking judicial relief by uttering 
statements inconsistent with its own sworn statement in a prior judicial 
proceeding". 
Elaine Jenkins alleged in her Complaint that she and her then husband, 
Sam Jenkins, acquired their interest in the subject property in 1988. In 1996, 
Elaine Jenkins filed for divorce from Sam Jenkins. Sam and Elaine Jenkins 
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were both represented by attorneys in the divorce action and they entered into a 
stipulated property settlement of all property they owned and in which they had 
any interest. Paragraphs 10 and 11 of the Stipulation, executed by Elaine 
Jenkins, her then husband, their attorneys, the guardian ad litem appointed to 
represent the children of the marriage and an assistant attorney general, state as 
follows: 
10. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired certain real 
property in Rupert, Idaho. Immediately upon entry of the Decree of 
Divorce Defendant shall deliver to Plaintiff a properly executed deed 
quitclaiming to Plaintiff Defendant's interest in the real property in lieu 
of alimony. 
11. The parties acquired no other real property during the course of the 
marriage. 
Based upon the Stipulation of the parties, the Court entered its Findings 
of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and parroted the above-quoted language of 
the Stipulation in the Decree of Divorce in the action, which provided in 
paragraphs 11 and 12, 
11. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired certain real 
property in Rupert, Idaho. Immediately upon entry of the Decree of 
Divorce Defendant shall deliver to Plaintiff a properly executed deed 
quitclaiming to Plaintiff Defendant's interest in the real property in lieu 
of alimony. 
12. The parties acquired no other real property during the course of the 
marriage. 
Judicial Estoppel, or collateral estoppel, is the issue preclusion branch, 
as differentiated from claim preclusion, of res judicata. As stated in White 
Pine Ranches v. Qgusthorpe. 731 P2d 1076 (Utah 1986), 
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While it is true that the party asserting the collateral estoppel need not 
have been a party to the first action, the party against whom the 
estoppel is asserted must have been a party or in privity with a party. 
Plaintiff was clearly a party to the first action for divorce, and is bound 
by her statements and the position she took in that action, i.e., that she and Sam 
Jenkins had acquired no ownership interest in any real property, other than in 
Rupert, Idaho. She did not claim that she acquired any interest in the property 
subsequent to her divorce. 
The case of Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Newevs, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214, 
410 Utah Adv. Rep. 11, 2000 UT 93, discussed each of the relevant issues in 
the case at hand. In Macris the court said on page 1222 of the opinion, 
We apply a four-part test to determine whether the doctrine of issue 
preclusion is applicable: First, the issue challenged must be identical in 
the previous action and in the case at hand. Second, the issue must 
have been decided in a final judgment on the merits in the previous 
action. Third, the issue must have been competently, fully and fairly 
litigated in the previous action. Fourth, the party against whom 
collateral estoppel is invoked in the current action must have been 
either a party or privy to a party in the previous action. (Citations 
omitted.) 
In Macris, the issue was whether additional damages that arose after the 
first trial, could be awarded in a subsequent trial against a successor-in-interest 
of the defendant sued in the first action. The Court on page 1223, said, 
Macris argues that because the trial court limited its award of damages 
to August 31, 1992, the issue of Macris's entitlement to damages 
accruing after August 31, 1992, was never actually litigated or decided 
in Macris I. Clearly, if an issue is actually raised by proper pleadings 
and treated as an issue in a case, it is conclusively determined by the 
first judgment. See Int'l Res., 599 P.2d at 517. However, the 
preclusive effects of the doctrine of collateral estoppel go further. The 
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general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or questions 
which were in issue and adjudicated in a former action is applicable to 
all matters essentially connected with the subject matter of the 
litigation. This application of the general rule extends to questions 
necessarily involved in an issue... although no specific finding may 
have been made in reference to that matter, and although such matters 
were not directly referred to in the pleadings. 46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments 
Sec. 545. It follows, therefore, that a party cannot by negligence or 
design withhold issues and litigate them in separate actions. If the 
second action involves an issue as to which the judgment in a prior 
action is a conclusive adjudication, the estoppel, so far as that issue is 
concerned, extends to every matter which was or might have been 
urged to sustain or defeat the determination actually made. See Id. 
In the Jenkins5 divorce action, there were clear findings, specifically 
regarding the issue of property ownership, or the lack thereof. Elaine Jenkins 
testified that she signed the stipulation on the advice of her attorney, who 
represented to her that it wasn't necessary to address ownership of the property 
in the divorce action (R. at 384, p. 122). Even if her testimony were true, as 
Macris makes clear, "a party cannot by negligence or design withhold issues 
and litigate them in separate actions". 
Macris also ruled that issues decided by stipulation of the parties, as was 
done in the Jenkins' divorce action, satisfy the "fully and fairly litigated" 
requirement of collateral estoppel. The Court ruled on pages 1223-1224 of the 
decision, 
Macris further argues that because the issue of contract damages was 
decided by stipulation, it was not actually litigated and decided for 
collateral estoppel purposes.An issue determined by stipulation rather 
than judicial resolution is binding in a subsequent action if the parties 
manifested an intention to that effect. See, e.g., 18 Charles A. Wright, 
Arthur R. Miller &Edward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure 
Sec. 4443, at 382 (1981) ("Issue preclusion does not attach unless it is 
15 
clearly shown that the parties intended that the issue be foreclosed in 
other litigation."); 18 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 
Sec. 132.03[2][h][ii] (Mathew Bender, 3d ed. 2000) ("[Stipulation 
may be binding in a subsequent action ... if the parties ... manifested 
an intention to that effect."). In this case, Macris does not argue that 
the stipulation concerning contract damages was not binding in general; 
rather, Macris argues that the stipulation was not binding as to damages 
accruing after August 31, 1992, the date on which Images transferred 
its assets to Neways. However, if the stipulation is meant to be final as 
to some damages but not final as to other damages, it must say so. Our 
review of the record in this case, however, evidences no such intention. 
Moreover, the trial court made no finding that its damages award — 
which was based on the parties stipulation — was not final as to all 
damages. Therefore, we find that the stipulation in this case has res 
judicata effect. 
Regarding the fourth element of the test outlined above, the Court ruled, 
Unlike the doctrine of claim preclusion, issue preclusion does not 
require that both cases involve the same parties or their privies. Rather, 
issue preclusion applies even if only the party against whom the 
doctrine is asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior 
adjudication. (Citations omitted). 
The facts of our case fit squarely within and meet each of the four 
requirements for collateral estoppel or judicial estoppel to apply. First, the 
issue of the ownership, or lack thereof, of the subject real property is identical 
in this action and in the previous divorce action. Second, the Decree of 
Divorce ruled as a final judgment, that neither Sam Jenkins nor Elaine Jenkins 
had acquired an interest in any real property during the course of their 
marriage, other than the real property in Rupert, Idaho. Third, the issue was 
competently, fully and fairly litigated in the previous action, by way of 
stipulation of the parties, approved by their attorneys and adopted by the 
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Judge. Fourth, Elaine Jenkins, Plaintiff in the previous divorce action, is the 
person against whom collateral estoppel is invoked in this current action. 
Accordingly, there was no issue as to any material fact and Appellant was 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Plaintiffs Complaint should have 
been dismissed and Appellant should have been awarded judgment consistent 
with his prayer for relief, on his Complaint in case #050904099, which was 
consolidated with case #050903391. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING ALAN JENKINS' 
MOTION TO AMEND HIS ANSWER TO INCLUDE THE DEFENSE 
OF THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Rule 15, U.R.C.P. provides 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of 
course at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the 
pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the 
action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it 
at any time within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may 
amend his pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the 
adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. 
Alan Jenkins' Answer to the Complaint in case # 050903391, initially 
raised as an affirmative defense, statutes of limitation, U.C.A. 78-12-7 and 78-
12.12. (R. at 13-16). On June 23, 2006, Defendants moved to amend their 
Answer to include the additional affirmative defense of the statutes of 
limitations, U.C.A. 78-12-25 and 78-12-26. (R. at 244-245). This was over 
three months before the date the trial of the case was scheduled to begin. 
U.C.A. 78-12-25, provides: 
An action may be brought within four years: 
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(1) upon a contract, obligation, or liability not founded upon an 
instrument in writing; 
(3) for relief not otherwise provided for by law. 
U.C.A. 78-12-26, provides: 
An action may be brought within three years: 
(3) for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake; except that the cause of 
action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the 
aggrieved party of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake 
The trial court heard argument on the motion on August 14, 2006 and 
denied the motion. (R. at 282). Although the Minute Entry directed Elaine 
Jenkins' attorney to prepare the Order, no Order was filed and the reason for 
the denial is not apparent from the record. 
In considering a motion to amend pleadings, the primary considerations 
are whether the parties have adequate notice to meet new issues and whether 
any party would receive an unfair advantage because of the amendment. 
Ringwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 1350, (Utah Ct. App.) cert, 
denied 795 P. 2d 1138 (Utah 1990). As Rule 15, U.R.C.P. states, "leave [to 
amend] shall be freely given when justice so requires." It should be the goal of 
the court to see 
[Tjhat the parties are afforded the privilege of presenting whatever 
legitimate contentions they have pertaining to their dispute. What they 
are entitled to is notice of the issues raised and an opportunity to meet 
them. When this is accomplished, that is all that is required. Our rules 
provide for liberality to allow examination into and settlement of all 
issues bearing upon the controversy, but safeguard the rights of the 
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other party to have a reasonable time to meet a new issue if he so 
requests. Rule 15(b), U.R.C.P. so states. It further allows for an 
amendment to conform to the proof after trial or even after judgment, 
and indicates that if the ends of justice so require, "failure so to amend 
does not affect the result of the trial of these issues." This idea is 
confirmed by Rule 54(c)(1), U.R.C.P.: "[E]very final judgment shall 
grant the relief to which the party in whose favor it is rendered is 
entitled, even if the party has not demanded such relief in his 
pleadings." A. H. Cheney v. W. R. Rucker, 14 Utah 2d 205 at 211, 
381 P.2d 86, at 91 (1963). 
The trial court in our case recognized these basic rules when it granted 
Elaine Jenkins leave to amend her Complaint a second time to add additional 
parties, even though the deadline for adding new parties had passed and the 
discovery deadline had passed, when it ruled, 
Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to 
amend should be liberally granted. This, combined with the relatively 
young age of the case and the fact that it is likely no additional 
discovery will be required as a result, leads the Court to conclude 
amendment should be permitted. Further, amendment promotes the 
preference in our system of justice of rendering decisions on the merits. 
(R. at 116). 
In the case at hand, the proposed amendment would have required no 
additional discovery by Elaine Jenkins. Since the statute of limitations is an 
affirmative defense, the burden was on Alan Jenkins to prove the elements of 
the defense. Two statutes of limitations were pled as affirmative defenses in 
Mr. Jenkins' initial answer, so the time line of events was clearly at issue from 
the beginning of the case. The proposed amendment would have simply added 
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two additional statutes that became material once Alan Jenkins completed his 
discovery and interviewed witnesses in preparation for trial. 
One of the critical issues regarding the statutes of limitations proposed to 
be added as affirmative defenses was, when did Elaine Jenkins know or should 
have known that she had a cause of action against the defendants named in her 
action. Elaine Jenkins filed her Complaint on February 18, 2005, alleging that 
she owned the property at issue and that the named Defendants held the 
property for her under a theory of constructive trust. After discovery had been 
completed and witnesses interviewed in preparation for the trial, Alan Jenkins 
discovered that Elaine certainly knew that she had a cause of action several 
years before she filed her Complaint, because she had asked that title to the 
property be transferred to her in 1997, eight years before she filed the 
Complaint. Elaine Jenkins confirmed these events in her testimony at trial: 
Q. BY MR. CLINE: Do you recall seeing any of those letters? 
A. Yes I do. 
Q. And did you receive those letters in the mail? 
A. Yes 
Q. What did you do when you received those in the mail? 
A. I didn't do anything. 
Q. Did you call Ms. Crossley? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did you talk to her? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Was it after this that you went and talked to Paul Kingston? 
A. It was after my husband's death, right after his death. 
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Q. So these were the summer of--
A. Yes. 
Q. What are the dates on there? 
A. May 15th, 1997 on this one. So yes, it was after the - - yes. 
Q. So it would have been shortly after you received these letters you 
went and talked to Paul Kingston? 
A. Yes. 
Q. This is where you had the conversation that you've previously 
testified about, where he acknowledged that you owned the property 
and you tried to negotiate getting the deed? 
A. Yes. 
(R. at 384, pp. 441-442) 
If adding two new defendants to the case, as the court ruled in permitting 
Elaine to file a second amended complaint, would not likely require additional 
discovery, then adding two additional statutes of limitation as defenses, where 
the statute of limitations had already been pled as defenses in Alan Jenkins' 
initial Answer, would certainly not likely require additional discovery. The 
proposed amendment particularly would not require any additional discovery 
by Elaine Jenkins, where these are affirmative defenses and the named 
defendants would have had the burden of proving them. More than ninety 
days between the time the motion was filed and the date set for trial, was 
certainly adequate time to put Elaine Jenkins on notice of the defenses, and 
allowing the amendment would not have resulted in any prejudice. On the 
other hand, denying Alan Jenkins and Davis County Co-operative Society, Inc. 
the right to present those defenses, where they were certainly viable and likely 
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would have resulted in a far different outcome, denied them the justice that the 
court is obligated to provide to all parties. 
In the case of Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development. 
Inc., 970 P.2d 1273, (Utah 1998), our Supreme Court ruled that it was an abuse 
of discretion, requiring remand, for a trial court to refuse to grant the leave to 
amend without any justifying reason appearing in the record for the denial. 
The Supreme Court in Aurora said, 
In deciding a motion to amend, the trial court should primarily consider 
whether granting the motion would subject the opposing party to 
unavoidable prejudice by having an issue adjudicated for which he had 
not time to prepare. 
Although it appears that at the very least, remand of this case is required 
to allow the trial court to assess the factors that must be reviewed to determine 
whether or not the motion should have been granted, and then make a record of 
that assessment for the appellate court to review, in this case Alan Jenkins 
submits that the record is clear that the denial was an abuse of discretion. 
There can be no showing of prejudice to Elaine Jenkins and the motion should 
have been granted. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS REQUESTED BY ALAN JENKINS 
Alan Jenkins requested 8 separate, material jury instructions that were 
not given by the trial court. (R. at 297-305). The requested instructions went 
to the heart of Alan Jenkins' theory of the case. Alan Jenkins theory was that 
the property had been purchased and was owned by D. U. Co., Inc. Sam and 
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Elaine Jenkins were tenants of the property. After Sam (Alan's brother) and 
Elaine were divorced, Alan paid the rent on the property to avoid having Sam's 
children evicted from the premises. D. U. Co. intended to evict Elaine and the 
children from the property for failure to maintain the property, even though 
Alan Jenkins had been paying the rent. Sam and Elaine denied having any 
ownership in the property, when their assets were distributed in their divorce 
action. Alan Jenkins purchased the property from D. U. Co. in an attempt to 
assist Sam's children. After the purchase, Alan learned that it would be 
impossible to work with Elaine to make the improvements to the premises 
mandated by the local health agencies, unless Elaine Jenkins and her children 
were removed from the property. Alan, as owner of the property, attempted to 
have Elaine and her children removed, in order to make the needed repairs. 
Each of the requested instructions is supported by statute or case law, as 
cited after the requested instruction and evidence was presented that clearly put 
the theories covered by the requested instructions at issue. 
The proposed instructions at R. 298, 299, 300 and 304 addressed Alan 
Jenkins' theory that Elaine Jenkins had no interest in the property and had no 
evidence that there was any agreement that she would be given any interest, 
other than as tenant. This theory was supported by documents presented as 
evidence, that showed record title to the property going from Gordon Berg to 
D.U. Co., Inc., to Alan Jenkins, to Alan Jenkins, Trustee. (Exs. D-12, D-14, D-
16). The testimony of Verl Johnson, Alan Jenkins, Luann Calfa, Joseph 
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Kingston, Alanna Kingston, Elaine Crossley and Francis Mark Hansen also 
supported this theory. Verl Johnson, Vice President of D. U. Co., testified that 
to his knowledge, D. U. Co., did not hold title to any property that was not 
owned by D. U. Company (R. at 385, p. 212); that Elaine Jenkins was a tenant 
of the property (R. at 385, p. 213); and that D. U. Co. Inc. owned the subject 
property, received the property tax notices and paid the taxes on the property 
until it was sold to Alan Jenkins (R. at 385, pp. 213-214). 
Alan Jenkins testified that he purchased the subject property from D. U. 
Co. for the price of $126, 347.75 (R. at 385, pp. 227-227); that he was present 
when the agreement was reached that Sam and Elaine Jenkins would rent the 
property for $250.00 per month plus Sam would help D. U. Co. on its rental 
properties (R. at 385, pp. 232-233); that he (Alan) paid the rent on the property 
for Sam and Elaine (R. at 385, pp. 237-238, 240, Ex. D-17); that he went over 
the Stipulation in the divorce action with Sam Jenkins and his attorney when 
Sam and Elaine acknowledged that they owned no real property, except the 
home in Idaho (R. at 385, p. 239). 
Luann Calfa, employed by Salt Lake City Housing and Zoning 
Enforcement, testified that Elaine Jenkins told her that she was not the owner 
of the property (R. at 385, p. 314). 
Joseph Kingston, property manager for D. U. Co., testified that Sam and 
Elaine Jenkins were renting the property (R. at 385, p. 323). 
24 
Alanna Kingston, secretary of Davis County Co-operative Society, 
testified that Sam and Elaine Jenkins told her that they were renting the subject 
property (R. at 385, p. 350). 
Elaine Crossley, who was formerly employed by D. U. Co., testified that 
Elaine Jenkins was a tenant of the subject property (R. at 386, p. 397); that 
Sam and Elaine Jenkins paid rent on the property (R. at 386, p. 398); that 
Elaine filled out a form for housing assistance (Ex. D-8), that acknowledged 
that she was renting the property for $250.00 per month (R. at 386, pp 406-
407). 
Francis Mark Hansen testified that he represented Sam Jenkins in the 
divorce action against Elaine Jenkins (R. at 386, p. 421); that he required Sam 
to disclose all of his assets and liabilities (R. at 386, p. 423); that he discussed 
with Sam the Stipulation, specifically with respect to any real property the 
parties owned, and that it was very clear that the parties did not own the 
subject property, but were only renting (R. at 386, p. 425). 
The proposed instructions at R.301 and 302 addressed Alan Jenkins 
theory that Elaine Jenkins' claims to the property were barred by the applicable 
statute of limitations. 
The proposed instructions at R. 303 and 305, addressed Alan Jenkins 
theory that Elaine Jenkins' claims were barred by estoppal and judicial 
estoppal. Again, the evidence that Sam and Elaine Jenkins denied that they 
owned the property, stipulated in their divorce action that they did not own the 
25 
property, allowed Alan Jenkins to pay rent on their behalf for the property, 
which ultimately led Alan Jenkins to purchase the property from D. U. Co., the 
record title holder, supported Alan Jenkins' theory. 
Although there was contradictory testimony regarding ownership of the 
property, Alan Jenkins was entitled to present his theories of the case to the 
jury, through instructions that set forth the governing law. By refusing to 
instruct the jury on Alan Jenkins' theories, the trial court committed error. 
CONCLUSION 
Because the trial court erred in denying Alan Jenkins' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, the trial court's decision should be reversed and judgment 
awarded to Alan Jenkins in accordance with the prayer in his Complaint in 
case #050904099. Further, even if it were not error to deny Alan Jenkins' 
motion for summary judgment, because the trial court erred in denying the 
motion of Alan Jenkins and Davis County Co-operative Society for leave to 
amend their Answer to assert additional Stature of Limitations defenses, 
without stating for the record the reasons for the denial, the case should be 
remanded either to direct the court to allow the amendment and for a new 
trial, or for the trial court to review its denial and either permit the amendment 
and grant a new trial, or state on the record the reasons for the denial. Further, 
because the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury instructions requested 
by Alan Jenkins and Davis County Co-operative Society, the case should be 
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remanded to the trial court for a new trial, with the requested jury instructions 
properly given to the jurors. 
Dated this .-/ day of April, 2008. 
^ - V - < ^ * g ^ 
Carl E. Kingston ^ 
Attorney for Appellant Alan Jenkins 
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ALAN JENKINS, TRUSTEE, D.U. 
COMPANY, INC., DAVIS COUNTY 
COOPERATIVE SOCIETY, INC., 
Defendants. 
JUDGMENT 
CIVIL NO. 050903391 
JUDGE: Fratto 
This matter having come before the Court for jury trial on October 11,12, and 13,2006, and 
plaintiff being represented by Russell A. Cline and defendants Alan Jenkins, Trustee, and Davis 
County Cooperative Society, Inc. being represented by Carl Kingston, and D.U. Company, Inc. 
having previously been dismissed from this action on a motion by D.U. Company, Inc., and the jury 
having made its findings in this matter pursuant to a Special Verdict, and good cause appearing, it 
is hereby ordered, decreed and adjudged as follows: Judgment @J 
JD20920160 
050903391 JENKINS.ALAN 
1. All of plaintiff s claims in the consolidated action of Alan Jenkins, Trustee vs. Elaine 
Jenkins, Loren Jenkins, Stanley Jenkins and Jeremiah Jenkins, Civil No. 050904099, including all 
claims for payment of rent, are hereby dismissed on the merits and with prejudice. 
2. The property at 1074 Redwood Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, as more fully described 
below, is hereby quieted in the name of Samuel Jenkins and Elaine Jenkins, free and clear of any 
liens or claims affecting title to the foregoing property by Alan Jenkins, individually and/or as 
Trustee of the A. Jenkins Trust, Davis County Cooperative Society, Inc. or D.U. Company, Inc. 
3. The property referenced in paragraph 2 is the following property located in Salt Lake 
County, Utah: 
Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0°20f West 2099 ft and 75 ft East 
from the Northwest Corner of the Northeast 1/4 of Sec 27, T IN, R 1W, 
SLB&M; thence South 0°20' West 60 ft; thence East 130 ft; thence 
North 0°20' East 60 ft; thence West 130 ft to the pont of beginning, 
cont. 0.18 acres. 
ALSO 
Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0°20' West 2039,ft and 75 ft East 
from the Northwest Corner of the Northeast 1/4 of Sec 27, T IN, R1W, 
SLB&M; thence South 0°20' West 60 ft; thence East 130 ft; thence 
North 0°20T Easi 60 ft; thence West 130 ft lo the point of beginning, 
cont. 0.18 acres. 
Parcel No. 08-27-251-011 
4. Plaintiff is awarded costs against defendants Alan Jenkins and Davis County 
Cooperative Society, Inc. in the amount of $875.04. 
5. This Judgment is not intended to preclude defendants from hereafter asserting any 
claim which was not required to be raised in this action, whether as a defense to plaintiffs quiet title 
action, pursuant to Rule 13 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or otherwise, that may result in a 
lien against the Property. 
DATED this JI day of December, 2006 





Rule 15 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 58 
Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings. 
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course 
at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to 
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed 
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after 
it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court 
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when 
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading 
within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10 
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the 
longer, unless the court otherwise orders. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
—oooOooo— 
ELAINE JENKINS, : 
Plaintiff, : MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. : 
Civil No. 050903391 
ALAN JENKINS, TRUSTEE, : 
Defendants. : Judge Fratto 
—oooOooo— 
Comes now the Plaintiff and moves the Court for Summary Judgment in favor of 
Defendant, against Plaintiff, dismissing Plaintiffs Complaint and awarding judgment to 
Defendant in accordance with the prayer of his Complaint in case #050904099, 
consolidated with this action. This Motion is based upon the pleadings in this case and 
Defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities submitted herewith, which show 
that there is no dispute as to any material fact and that Defendant is entitled to judgment 
as a matter of law. 
Dated this Y day of August, 2005. 
^ 
S< 
Carl E. Kingston 
Attorney for Defendant 
£=> 4 
CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Motion for Summary 
Judgment to Russell A. Cline, Esq., 10 West 100 South, Suite 425, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101, this f day of August, 2005, postage prepaid. 
Carl E. Kingston 
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ALAN JENKINS, TRUSTEE, D.U. 
COMPANY, INC., DAVIS COUNTY 
COOPERATIVE SOCIETY, INC., 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
CIVIL NO. 050903391 
JUDGE: Fratto 
Defendant Alan Jenkins, Trustee's, Motion for Summary Judgment having come before the 
Court on Monday, November 7,2005, and plaintiff being represented by Russell A. Cline, defendant 
being represented by Carl Kingston, and good cause appearing, it is hereby ordered, decreed and 
adjudged as follows: 
1. Defendant Alan Jenkins' Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. 
14-,! 
DATED this / *7 day of November, 2005 .£ 
Approved as to Form: 
Carl Kingston 
ADDENDUM 5 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ELAINE JENKINS, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 
ALAN JENKINS, TRUSTEE, 
De fendan t , 
FILED OiSTIlCT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MINUTE ENTRY A ^ ' J 2005 J j 
SALT LA^E COUNTY 
Case No. 0 5 0 9 0 ^ 3 9 I _ _ _ V 
Deputy Clerk 
Hon. JOSEPH C. FRATTO, J^J 
August 16, 2005 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to File Second Amended Complaint, 
submitted for decision on July 27, 2005. A hearing has not 
requested, nor is one required by the Rules. Accordingly, the 
ruling with respect tc this matter will be addressed in the 
following Minute Entry. 
Pursuant to Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
leave to amend should be liberally granted. This, combined with 
the relatively young age of the case and the fact that it is 
likely no additional discovery will be required as a result, 
leads the Court to conclude amendment should be permitted. 
Further, amendment promotes the preference in our system of 
justice of rendering decisions on the merits. 
Based upon the forgoing, Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to 
File Second Amended Complaint is granted. 
\\U 
DATED t h i s 
& 
day of A u g u s t , 2005 
\n 
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CARL E. KINGSTON (#1826) 
Attorney for Defendants 
3212 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
Phone: 486-1458 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH, SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
—oooOooo— 
ELAINE JENKINS, : 
Plaintiff, : MOTION TO AMEND 
ANSWERS OF DEFENDANTS 
vs. : 
Civil No. 050903391 
ALAN JENKINS, TRUSTEE, et al., : 
Defendants. : Judge Fratto 
—oooOooo— 
Come now the Defendants and move the Court for an Order permitting 
them to amend their Answers filed in this case, to include the affirmative defenses 
of the statutes of limitations, particularly, U.C.A. 78-12-25 and 78=12=26. Copies 
of the proposed Amended Answers are submitted herewith. 
Dated this day of June, 2006. 
Carl E. Kingston 
Attorney for Defendants 
NO 
CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I faxed and mailed a copy of the foregoing Motion to 
Russell A. Cline, Esq., facsimile #322-1054, 10 West 100 South, Suite 425, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84101, t h i s ^ > ^ day of June, 2006, postage prepaid. 
Carl E. Kingston 
't^ 
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ALAN JENKINS Et al, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
MOTION TO AMEND ANSWERS 
Case No: 050903391 PR 
Judge: JOSEPH C. FRATTO 
Date: August 14, 2 006 
Clerk: wendyd 
PRESENT 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): RUSSELL A CLINE 
Defendant's Attorney(s): CARL E KINGSTON 
Video 




Matter is before the Court on defendant's motion to amend answer. 
Counsel state their arguments. 
The Court states findings and denies the motion. 
Mr. Cline to prepare the order. 
Page 1 (last) 
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WHEN RECORDED, MAIL TO: 
Space Above for Recorder's Use 
4354404 Harrantg Deed 
, County of Salt Lake 
D. GORDON BERG 
tfSalt Lake City 
hereby CONVEY and WARRANT to 
D. U. COMPANY, INC. 
53 West Angelo Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
of Salt Lake City , County of Salt Lake 
for the sum of Ten Dollars and other good and valuable consideration 
, grantor, 
, State of Utah, 
, grantee, 
, State of Utah, 
DOLLARS, 
the following described tract of land in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, to-wit: 
Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0°20T West 2099 ft and 75 ft East from 
the Northwest Corner of the Northeast i of Sec 27, T IN, R IW, SLB&M ; 
thence South 0°20T West 60 ft; thence E&&t 130 ft}', thence North 0°20f 
/ East 60 ft; thence West 130 ft to the point of beginning, cont. 0.18 acres. 
I ALSO 
I Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0°20f West 2039 ft and 75 ft East from the 
! Northwest Corner of the Northeast i of Sec 27, T IN, R IW, SLB&M; thence 
f South 0°20T West 60 ft; thence East 130 ft; thence North 0°20T East 60 ft; 
| thence West 130 ft to the point of beginning, cont. 0.18 acres. 
^3 
>ts 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor ,this 21st 
Signed in the presence of 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT L/[] 
On the 21st day of November 
day of November ,19 86 




who duly. aekriowi^ foedito me that he executed the same. 
/ 7 x \0 ( A/% \ 
9 86 , personally appeared before me 
, the signer of the above instrument, 
j»i<^Z, 
My Commission. Expires: 
• ' July i;>*88 
FORM 101.1 ^MmmANTY DEED — Krflv C.n «K W KWK C~..»U aw ~ 
NotarylPublic^ 
Residing at: Salt Lake City, Utah 
ADDENDUM 9 
When recorded, mail to: 
Alan Jenkins 
3212 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
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RECORDER, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH 
ALAN JEHKINS 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 3212 S STATE 
SLC UT 84115 Z$V\ \ p . 
D.U. COMPANY, INC. a corporation organized and existing ijft&er-tlfe lfiWffthe<8tabP-
of Utah, with its principle office in Salt Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, Grantor, 
hereby conveys and warrants against all claiming by, through or under it to ALAN JENKINS, 
3212 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, Grantee, 
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration, the following 
described tract of land in Salt Lake County, Utah: 
Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0°20' West 2099 ft and 75 ft East from the 
Northwest Corner of the Northeast H of Sec 27, T IN, R 1W, SLB&M; thence 
South 0°20' West 60 ft; thence East 130 ft; thence North 0°20' East 60 ft; 
thence West 130 ft to the point of beginning, cont. 0.18 acres. 
ALSO 
Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0° 20' West 2039 ft and 75 ft East from the 
Northwest Corner of the Northeast H of Sec 27, T IN, R 1W, SLB&M; thence 
South 0°20' West 60 ft; thence East 130 ft; thence North 0°20'East 60 ft; 






The officers who sign this deed hereby certify that this deed and the transfer represented 
thereby was duly authorized under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the 
grantor at a lawful meeting duly held and attended by a quorum. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the grantor has caused its corporate name and seal to be 
hereunto affixed by its duly authorized officers this Lfl1 day of F&brutOLru , 20#5 
°t-
Attest: 
(Corporate Seal) Secretary 
D.U. COMPANY, I 
Bv: /2a hA^oCt^ey^^ 
A.O. Gardner, Secretary 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the gr* day of & _, 20 Dai, personally appeared before me 
, who being byme duly sworn, did say, each for himself, that s/he 
is the president of D.U. COMPANY, INC., and that the within and foregoing instrument was 
signed in behalf of said corporation by the authority of a resolution of its board of directors, and 
said A.O- GjQJrdjflUT duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed 
thes; NOTARY FUBUtfT 
ELAINE CKOkSLfcV 
3212 S. STATE ST. 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT MW* 
MY COMMISSION £Kftftf& 
SEPTEMBER 2** *&& 
STATS OF UTAK 
eal of the said corporation. 
Notary Public 0 
DEFENDANT'S 
EXHIBIT * H 
V£*ft<6cl7)<te#>( 
ADDENDUM 10 
When recorded, mail to: 
Alan Jenkins 
3212 South State 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED 
•y^ 9*500*3 
02/08/2005 03s 22 PM * i i . OO 
Book - 9092 F'3 - 5/H9 
G A R Y U . O T T 
RECORDER, :3ALT LAKE COUNTY? iiT'4M 
ALAN JENKINS 
3212 S STATE 
SIX UT 84115 
BY: ZJM, DEPUTY - UI 1 P. 
ALAN JENKINS, Grantor, of Salt Lake City, Utah, Salt Lake County hereby conveys 
and warrants against all claiming by, through or under it, but not otherwise to A. JENKINS 
TRUST, 3212 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah, Grantee, A/a* Jenkins TrusZ&s 
for the sum of TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration, the following 
described tract of land in Salt Lake County, Utah: 
00 
5*> 
Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0°20' West 2099 ft and 75 ft East from the 
Northwest Corner of the Northeast H of Sec 27, T IN, R 1W, SLB&M; thence 
South 0°20' West 60 ft; thence East 130 ft; thence North 0°20' East 60 ft; 
thence West 130 ft to the point of beginning, cont. 0.18 acres. 
ALSO 
Beginning 27.9 ft West and South 0° 20' West 2039 ft and 75 ft East from the 
Northwest Corner of the Northeast H of Sec 27, T IN, R 1W, SLB&M; thence 
South 0°20' West 60 ft; thence East 130 ft; thence North 0°20'East 60 ft; 
thence West 130 ft to the point of beginning, cont. 0.18 acres. 
WITNESS the hand of said grantor this V day of f i L ,20Q f^ 
STATE OF UTAH 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the f day of Y^^^W^y^ 20<^J, personally appeared before me 
, the signer of the above instrument, who being by me duly sworn, 
did say, that he executed the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
CARL 6. KINGSTON 
3212 South State Street 
Spit Lake City, UT 84115 
My Commission Expires 
06/22/2008 
- -STATE OF UTAH 
«^&*"-r 6 ^r? 
Notary Public 
ADDENDUM 11 
F. Mark Hansen, #5078 
624 North 300 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 533-2700 
Attorney for Samuel Jenkins 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
) 
ELAINE JENKINS, ) STIPULATION AND MOTION FOR 
Plaintiff, ) ENTRY OF DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. ) 
) Civil No. 964905253 
SAMUEL WALTON JENKINS, ) Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Defendant. ) Commissioner T. P. Casey 
) 
STIPULATION 
The parties stipulate and agree as follows: 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Salt Lake County on May 17, 1975, have 
resided in the marital relationship in Utah, and are presently married. Plaintiff and Defendant 
separated on or about October 20, 1996. Plaintiff and Defendant are bona fide residents of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, and have been for three months immediately prior to the filing of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant have experienced irreconcilable differences in the course of 
the marriage that prevent them from pursuing a viable marriage relationship. 
3. There have been nine children born as issue of this marriage: Jennifer Elaine 
Jenkins, born February 27, 1976; Joseph William Jenkins, born October 22, 1977; Rose Marrie 
Jenkins, born June 6, 1979; Charles Isreal Jenkins, born May 27, 1981; Stanley Wallace Jenkins, 
born December 28, 1982; Samuel Lorin Jenkins, born November 17, 1984; Jeramiah Orsen 
Jenkins, born May 11, 1986; Rebeccah Rachelle Jenkins, born July 11, 1988; and Jesse Taylor 
Jenkins, born February 1, 1991. 
4. Utah is the home state of the children. There are no proceedings affecting the minor 
children, or any of them, filed or pending in Juvenile Court. 
" DEFENDANT'S* 
lip EXHIBIT lit 9 
5. Plaintiff shall be awarded sole legal and physical custody of the minor children. 
6. Defendant shall be awarded temporary visitation with the children for a period of six 
months as follows: 
(a) Wednesdays, to begin no earlier than 4:00 p.m. and end no later than 8:00 p.m. 
(b) Alternating weekends — Saturdays beginning June 7, 1997 for a five hour block of time to 
be agreed on by the parties, and Sundays from 3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 
(c) Labor Day from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. and Thanksgiving from 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. 
Birthdays on the following days during weekend visitation hours: Charles' birthday — May 
24, 1997; Rebecca's birthday — July 12, 1997; Lorin's birthday — November 16, 1997. 
(d) Father's Day from 3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 
(e) Two uninterrupted four-day overnight visits during the summer, one of which shall be from 
July 3, 1997 at 9:00 a.m. to July 6, 1997 at 9:00 p.m., and the other in August, to be agreed 
on by the parties and the children. Overnight visits shall be conditioned on Defendant 
having suitable sleeping accomodations for the children, which may include the use of tents 
and sleeping bags. 
(f) Telephone contact at reasonable hours. Phone calls by Defendant shall be initiated no later 
than 8:00 p.m. 
(g) Plaintiff and Defendant shall each make reasonable efforts to keep Defendant timely 
informed of events in the children's lives, including by way of example but not limitation: 
parent-teacher conferences; all events and activities involving school; scouting, athletics and 
clubs, artistic performances, all other organized activities of a public nature in which the 
children participate. Defendant shall be entitled to appear, see and speak with the children 
at all such events and activities. 
(h) Such other visitation as may be mutually agreed by the parties and the children. 
During the temporary visitation period, two or more of the parties' children born before 1985 shall 
be present during visitation with the parties' children born after 1985. There shall be a review at 
the conclusion of the temporary visitation period. If the review raises no significant concerns, 
visitation thereafter shall be according to the following schedule: 
(a) One weekday evening to be specified by Defendant from 5:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. 
(b) Alternating weekends from 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday. 
(c) In years ending in an odd number, Defendant is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) Children's birthdays on the day before or after the actual birth date from 3:00 p.m. 
to 9:00 p.m.; at Defendant's discretion he may take other siblings along for the birthday, 
(ii) Human Rights Day and Veterans's Day, from 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
to 7:00 p.m. on the holiday. 
(iii) Easter holiday and Memorial Day, from 6:00 p.m. on Friday to Sunday at 7:00 p.m., 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier time to which Defendant is completely entitled, 
(iv) July 24th from 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday to 11:00 p.m. on the holiday, 
(v) The time period beginning the evening the children get out of school for the 
Christmas school break plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m. 
(d) In years ending in an even number, Defendant is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) Children's birthdays on the actual birth date from 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; at 
Defendant's discretion he may take other siblings along for the birthday, 
(ii) New Year's Day, President's Day and Columbus Day, from 6:00 p.m. the day before 
the holiday until 7:00 p.m on the holiday. 
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(iii) July 4th from 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday to 11:00 p.m. on the holiday. 
(iv) Labor Day from 6:00 p.m. on Friday to Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday 
extends for a lengthier time to which Defendant is completely entitled. 
(v) The fall school break commonly known as U.E.A. weekend, and Thanksgiving 
holiday, from 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday to Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends 
for a lengthier time to which Defendant is completely entitled. 
(vi) From Christmas Day at 1:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. the last day of the Christmas school 
break. 
(e) Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes shall not be made to the 
regular rotation of the alternating weekend visitation, schedule. If a holiday falls on a 
regularly scheduled school day, Defendant shall be responsible for the child's attendance at 
school for that school day. If a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and 
the total holiday period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from school and 
Defendant is free from work, Defendant shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period. 
(f) Father's Day shall be spent with Defendant every year from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. 
Mother's Day shall be spent with Plaintiff every year from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. 
(g) Defendant may have extended visitation during the children's summer vacation from school 
for up to four weeks at Defendant's option. Two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for 
Defendant. The remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for Plaintiff consistent 
with the above visitatiori schedule. Plaintiff shall have an identical two week period of 
uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation from school for purposes of 
vacation. If the children are enrolled in year-round school, Defendant's extended visitation 
shall be xh of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided Plaintiff has holiday 
and phone visits. Notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks shall be provided at 
least 21 days in advance to the other parent. 
(h) Telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours. 
(i) Plaintiff and Defendant shall each make reasonable efforts to keep Defendant timely 
informed of events in the children's lives, including by way of example but not limitation: 
parent-teacher conferences; all events and activities involving school; scouting, athletics and 
clubs, artistic performances, all other organized activities of a public nature in which the 
children participate. Defendant shall be entitled to appear, see and speak with the children 
at all such events and activities. 
(j) Such other visitation as may be mutually agreed by the parties and the children. 
7. On October 30, 1996 a Protective Order was issued in the case of Elaine Jenkins v. 
Samuel Jenkins. Civil No. 960907171SA (Utah 3d. Dist. Ct, Judge Thome). The Protective Order 
shall be consolidated in the Decree of Divorce. Defendant's compliance with the Protective Order 
shall be reviewed at the same time as the review of temporary visitation. If there have been no 
violations of the Protective Order, Plaintiff and Defendant shall jointly move the court entering the 
Protective Order to set it aside. The following shall be entered as a protective order in this action: 
Neither party shall commit or threaten to commit any act of physical violence, injury, 
intimidation or harassment against the other party, or against any of the children, or 
against the other party's real or personal property. Neither party shall enter the real 
property of the other party, except for the purpose of implementing the child custody 
and visitation provisions of this Stipulation and the Decree of Divorce, or by prior 
invitation by the other party. 
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8. Child support shall be awarded as follows: 
(a) Child support shall be awarded pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines, using 
actual or imputed incomes of $867.00 per month for Plaintiff and $787.00 per month for 
Defendant, for a base child support award in the amount of $333.55 per month. 
(b) The base child support award shall be reduced by 50% for each child for time periods during 
which the child is with the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written agreement 
of the parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a recipient 
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, any agreement by the parties for reduction of 
child support during extended visitation shall be approved by the administrative agency. 
Normal visitation and holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an 
interruption of the consecutive day requirement. 
(c) Plaintiff shall be entitled to mandatory income withholding pursuant to U.C. A. 62A-11 Parts 
4 and 5. 
9. The provisions of U.C.A. sections 78-45-7.15 and -7.16 shall be incorporated and 
made a part of the divorce decrbe. 
10. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired certain real property in Rupert, 
Idaho. Immediately upon entry of the Decree of Divorce Defendant shall deliver to Plaintiff a 
properly executed deed quitclaiming to Plaintiff Defendant's interest in the real property in lieu of 
alimony. 
11. The parties acquired no other real property during the course of the marriage. 
12. Defendant shall be awarded all of his separate property and personal effects, his tools, 
one set of the parties' duplicate appliances and furnishings, and one of the parties' two computers. 
Plaintiff shall be awarded the Dodge van and the Dodge Lancer.' Defendant shall be awarded all 
other vehicles. Plaintiff shall be awarded all other personal property. 
13. Plaintiff and Defendant shall each be solely responsible for their own student loans, 
and shall each defend, indemnify and hold harmless the other from liability therefore. 
14. Defendant shall assume and pay, and hold Plaintiff harmless from liability on all other 
debts and obligations presently known to Defendant, incurred by the parties prior to their separation. 
Thereafter, all debts and obligations shall be the sole responsibility of the party who incurred the 
particular debt or obligation. 
15. Plaintiff and Defendant shall file separate income tax returns for 1995 and 1996. 
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16. Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the personal exemption for the parties' minor 
children on her income tax returns; provided that so long as Defendant is current in his child support 
obligation, Defendant shall be entitled to claim one less than half the personal exemptions for the 
minor children on his income tax return. 
17. Each party shall be responsible for his or her own attorney fees and costs. 
18. Each party shall execute and deliver to the other such documents as are required to 
implement this Stipulation and the Decree of Divorce. 
19. This Stipulation constitutes the entire agreement between Plaintiff and Defendant, and 
resolves all issues presently outstanding between Plaintiff and Defendant raised by the pleadings in 
this matter. 
MOTION 
Elaine Jenkins, Samuel Jenkins, the Guardian ad Litem and Utah Department of Human 
Services agree to the above Stipulation, and jointly move the Court to enter a Decree of Divorce 
incorporating the terms of the Stipulation. 




F. Mark Hansen, #5078 
624 North 300 West, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Telephone: (801) 533-2700 
Attorney for Samuel Jenkins 
flltflOlSrittCTCOIttT 
Third. Indicia! District 
AUG 6 |997 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 




SAMUEL WALTON JENKINS, 
Defendant. 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 964905253 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Commissioner T. P. Casey 
The parties having stipulated to the terms of a Decree of Divorce and having moved the 
Court to enter a Decree of Divorce incorporating the terms of the stipulation, the Court having 
reviewed the terms of the stipulation and finding those terms reasonable, and being fully informed, 
hereby enters the following Decree of Divorce. The Court orders as follows: 
1. Plaintiff and Defendant were married in Salt Lake County on May 17, 1975, have 
resided in the marital relationship in Utah, and are presently married. Plaintiff and Defendant 
separated on or about October 20, 1996. Plaintiff and Defendant are bona fide residents of Salt 
Lake County, Utah, and have been for three months immediately prior to the filing of this action. 
2. Plaintiff and Defendant have experienced irreconcilable differences in the course of 
the marriage that prevent them from pursuing a viable marriage relationship. 
3. There have been nine children born as issue of this marriage: Jennifer Elaine 
Jenkins, born February 27, 1976; Joseph William Jenkins, born October 22, 1977; Rose Marrie 
Jenkins, born June 6, 1979; Charles Isreal Jenkins, born May 27, 1981; Stanley Wallace Jenkins, 
born December 28, 1982; Samuel Lorin Jenkins, born November 17, 1984; Jeramiah Orsen 
Jenkins, born May 11, 1986; Rebeccah Rachelle Jenkins, born July 11, 1988; and Jesse Taylor 
Jenkins, born February 1, 1991. 
4. Utah is the home state of the children. There are no proceedings affecting the minor 
children, or any of them, filed or pending in Juvenile Court. 
5. Plaintiff is awarded sole legal and physical custody of the minor children. 
6. Defendant is awarded temporary visitation with the children for a period of six 
months as follows: 
(a) Wednesdays, to begin no earlier than 4:00 p.m. and end no later than 8:00 p.m. 
(b) Alternating weekends — Saturdays beginning June 7, 1997 for a five hour block of time to 
be agreed on by the parties, and Sundays from 3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 
(c) Labor Day from 10:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. and Thanksgiving from 9:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. 
Birthdays on the following Saturdays during weekend visitation hours: Charles' birthday — 
May 24, 1997; Rebecca's birthday — July 12, 1997; birthday — November 16, 1997. 
(d) Father's Day from 3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m. 
(e) Two uninterrupted four-day overnight visits during the summer, one of which shall be from 
July 3, 1997 at 9:00 a.m. to July 6, 1997 at 9:00 p.m., and the other in August, to be agreed 
on by the parties and the children. 
(f) Telephone contact at reasonable hours. Phone calls by Defendant shall be initiated no later 
than 8:00 p.m. 
(g) Plaintiff and Defendant shall each make reasonable efforts to keep Defendant timely 
informed of events in the children's lives, including by way of example but not limitation: 
parent-teacher conferences; all events and activities involving school; scouting, athletics and 
clubs, artistic performances, all other organized activities of a public nature in which the 
children participate. Defendant shall be entitled to appear, see and speak with the children 
at all such events and activities. 
(h) Such other visitation as may be mutually agreed by the parties and the children. 
During the temporary visitation period, two or more of the parties' children born before 1985 shall 
be present during visitation with the parties' children born after 1985. There shall be a review at 
the conclusion of the temporary visitation period. If the review raises no significant concerns, 
visitation thereafter shall be as follows: 
(a) One weekday evening to be specified by Defendant from 5:00 p.m. to 8:30 p.m. 
(b) Alternating weekends from 6:00 p.m. on Friday until 7:00 p.m. on Sunday. 
(c) In years ending in an odd number, Defendant is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) Children's birthdays on the day before or after the actual birth date from 3:00 p.m. 
to 9:00 p.m.; at Defendant's discretion he may take other siblings along for the birthday, 
(ii) Human Rights Day and Veterans's Day, from 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
to 7:00 p.m. on the holiday. 
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(iii) Easter holiday and Memorial Day, from 6:00 p.m. on Friday to Sunday at 7:00 p.m., 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier time to which Defendant is completely entitled, 
(iv) July 24th from 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday to 11:00 p.m. on the holiday, 
(v) The time period beginning the evening the children get out of school for the 
Christmas school break plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m. 
(d) In years ending in an even number, Defendant is entitled to the following holidays: 
(i) Children's birthdays on the actual birth date from 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; at 
Defendant's discretion he may take other siblings along for the birthday. 
(ii) New Year's Day, President's Day and Columbus Day, from 6:00 p.m. the day 
before the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday. 
(iii) July 4th from 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday to 11:00 p.m. on the holiday. 
(iv) Labor Day from 6:00 p.m. on Friday to Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday 
extends for a lengthier time to which Defendant is completely entitled. 
(v) The fall school break commonly known as U.E.A. weekend, and Thanksgiving 
holiday, from 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday to Sunday at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends 
for a lengthier time to which Defendant is completely entitled. 
(vi) From Christmas t)ay at 1:00 p.m. to 7:00 p.m. the last day of the Christmas school 
break. 
(e) Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes shall not be made to the 
regular rotation of the alternating weekend visitation schedule. If a holiday falls on a 
regularly scheduled school day, Defendant shall be responsible for the child's attendance at 
school for that school day. If a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and 
the total holiday period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from school and 
Defendant is free from work, Defendant shall be entitled to this lengthier holiday period. 
(0 Father's Day shall be spent with Defendant every year from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. 
Mother's Day shall be spent with Plaintiff every year from 9:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. 
(g) Defendant may have extended visitation during the children's summer vacation from school 
for up to four weeks at Defendant's option. Two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for 
Defendant. The remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for Plaintiff consistent 
with the above visitation schedule. Plaintiff shall have kn identical two week period of 
uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation from school for purposes of 
vacation. If the children are enrolled in year-round school, Defendant's extended visitation 
shall be Vi of the vacation time for year-round school breaks, provided Plaintiff has holiday 
and phone visits. Notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks shall be provided at 
least 21 days in advance to the other parent. 
(h) Telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours. 
(i) Plaintiff and Defendant shall each make reasonable efforts to keep Defendant timely 
informed of events in the children's lives, including by way of example but not limitation: 
parent-teacher conferences; all events and activities involving school; scouting, athletics and 
clubs, artistic performances, all other organized activities of a public nature in which the 
children participate. Defendant shall be entitled to appear, see and speak with the children 
at all such events and activities. 
(j) Such other visitation as may be mutually agreed by the parties and the children. 
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7. On October 30, 1996 a Protective Order was issued in the case of Elaine Jenkins v 
Samuel Jenkins. Civil No. 960907171SA (Utah 3d. Dist. Ct, Judge Thprne). The Protective Order 
is consolidated in this Decree of Divorce. Defendant's compliance with the Protective Order shall 
be reviewed at the same time as the review of temporary visitation. If there have been no 
substantive violations of the Protective Order, Plaintiff and Defendant shall jointly move the proper 
court to set it aside. The following is entered as a protective order in this action-: 
Neither party shall commit or threaten to commit any act of physical violence, 
injury, intimidation or harassment against the other party, or against any of the 
children, or against the other party's real or personal property. Neither party shall 
enter the real property of the other party, except for the purpose of implementing the 
child custody and visitatiop provisions of this Stipulation and the Decree of Divorce, 
or by prior invitation by the other party. 
8. Child support is awarded as follows: 
(a) Child support is awarded pursuant to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines, using actual 
or imputed incomes of $1,250.00 per month for Plaintiff and $850.00 per month for 
Defendant, for a base child support award in the amount of $337.16 per month. 
(b) The base child support award shall be reduced by 50% for each child for time periods during 
which the child is with the noncustodial parent by order of the court or by written agreement 
of the parties for at least 25 of any 30 consecutive days. If the dependent child is a recipient 
of Aid to Families with Dependent Children, any agreement by the parties for reduction of 
child support during extended visitation shall be approved by the administrative agency. 
Normal visitation and holiday visits to the custodial parent shall not be considered an 
interruption of the consecutive day requirement. 
(c) Plaintiff shall be entitled to mandatory income withholding pursuant to U.C. A. 62A-11 Parts 
4 and 5. 
9. If available, insurance for the medical expenses of the minor children shall be 
provided by the parent to whom it is most readily available at a reasonable cost. Each parent shall 
share equally the out-of-pocket costs of the premium actually paid for the children's portion of 
insurance, calculated by dividing the premium amount by the number of persons covered under the 
policy and multiplying the result by the number of minor children covered. Each parent shall share 
equally all reasonable and necessary uninsured medical expenses, including deductibles and 
copayments, incurred for the minor children. The parent maintaining coverage shall provide 
verification of coverage to the other parent upon initial enrollment of the minor children, and 
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thereafter on or before January 2 of each calender year. The parent shall also notify the other 
parent of any change of insurance carrier, premium, or benefits within 30 days of the date he or she 
first knew or should have known of the change. A parent who incurs medical expenses shall 
provide written verification of the cost and payment of medical expenses to the other parent within 
30 days of payments. A parent incurring medical expenses shall forfeit the right to receive credit 
for and to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if he or she fails to comply with the 
notice requirements of this paragraph. 
10. Each parent shall share equally the reasonable work-related child care expenses of 
the parents. If an actual expense for child care is incurred, a parent shall begin paying his share on 
a monthly basis immediately upon presentation of proof of the child care expense, but if the child 
care expense ceases to be incurred, that parent may suspend making monthly payments of that 
expense while it is not being incurred. A parent who incurs child care expense shall provide written 
verification of the cost and identity of a child care provider to the other parent upon initial 
engagement of a provider and thereafter on the request of the other parent. The parent shall notify 
the other parent of any change of child care provider or the monthly expense of child care within 
30 calendar days of the date of the change. A parent incurring child care expenses shall forfeit the 
right to receive credit for and to recover to other parent's share of the expenses if he or she fails to 
comply with the notice requirements of this paragraph. 
11. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired certain real property in 
Rupert, Idaho. Immediately upon entry of the Decree of Divorce Defendant shall execute and 
deliver to Plaintiff a deed quitclaiming his interest in the real property in lieu of alimony. 
12. The parties acquired no other real property during the course of the marriage. 
13. The parties have acquired certain items of personal property, which shall be divided 
as follows: Defendant is awarded all of his separate property and personal effects, his tools, one 
set of the parties' duplicate appliances and furnishings, and one of the parties' two computers. 
Plaintiff is awarded the Dodge van and the Dodge Lancer. Defendant is awarded all other vehicles. 
Plaintiff is awarded all other personal property. 
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14. Plaintiff and Defendant shall each be solely responsible for their own student loans, 
and shall each defend, indemnify and hold harmless the other from liability therefore. 
15. Defendant shall assume and pay, and hold Plaintiff harmless from liability on all 
other debts and obligations presently known to Defendant, incurred by the parties prior to their 
separation. Thereafter, all debts and obligations shall be the sole responsibility of the party who 
incurred the particular debt or obligation. 
16. Plaintiff and Defendant shall file separate income tax returns for 1995 and 1996. 
17. Plaintiff shall be entitled to claim the personal exemption for the parties' minor 
children on her income tax returns; provided that so long as Defendant is current in his child 
support obligation, Defendant shall be entitled to claim one less than half the personal exemptions 
for the minor children on his income tax return. 
18. Each party shall be responsible for his or her own attorney fees and costs. 
19. This Decree resolves all outstanding issues between Plaintiff and Defendant raised 
directly or indirectly by the pleadings in this matter. 
20. Each party shall execute and deliver to the other such documents as are required to 
implement this Decree of Divorce. 
2162p.008 
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Alan Jenkins, Trustee and Davis County Co-operative Society, Inc. propose the 
following jury instructions. 
Dated this /& day of October, 2006. 
Carl E. Kingston 
Attorney for Alan Jenkins, Trustee 
and Davis County 
Cooperative Society, Inc. 
Jury Instruction No. 
A person claiming an interest in real property, must be able to evidence that interest by a 
deed or conveyance in writing, signed by the entity or person from whom that person claims to 
have acquired the interest. If there is no such deed or conveyance in writing, under the law, that 
person has no enforceable interest in the property. 
U.C.A. 25-5-1 
•7^fe 
Jury Instruction No. 
There is an exception to the law that a person claiming an interest in real property must 
be able to evidence that interest by a deed or conveyance in writing, signed by the entity or 
person from whom that person claims to have acquired the interest. To qualify for the exception, 
Elaine Jenkins must prove by clear and positive proof that there was an agreement between her 
and the property owner that the property would be transferred to her if she performed certain 
conditions, the agreed conditions must be established with certainty and you must find that she 
did in fact perform those conditions pursuant to the agreement. 
U.C A. 25-5-8 
Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 160 P. 2d 570 (1953) 
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Jury Instruction No. 
"Agreement" means the actual bargain between the parties. An agreement for the sale of 
land is void and unenforceable unless the agreement or some note or memorandum of the 
agreement is in writing, signed by the party selling the land. 
U.C.A 25-5-3 
Birdzell v. Utah Oil Ref Co., 121 Utah 412, 242 P.2d 578 (1952) 
Jury Instruction No. 
There is a four year statute of limitations that governs the recovery of real property held 
by a person other than the owner of the property. This means that in order to recover property 
held in trust by another entity, the true owner must file suit to recover the property within four 
years from the time she discovers that the property was not in her name. Elaine Jenkins claims 
that although Alan Jenkins holds legal title to the property, she and her ex-husband Sam paid for 
the property and are the true owners of the property. If you find that Elaine Jenkins did pay for 
the subject property, in order to prevail on this claim. Elaine Jenkins must show that she did not 
learn that the property was in someone's name other than hers and Sam's until a date less than 
four years from the date she filed the Complaint in this case. If you find that Elaine Jenkins 
knew that the title to the property in question was held in someone's name other than hers or 
Sam's more than four years before she filed the lawsuit in this case, you must find in favor of 
Alan Jenkins. 
U.C.A. 78-12-25 
American Tierra Corp. v. City of West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757 (Utah 1992), 
Jury Instruction No. 
The occupation of real property by someone other than the person who establishes legal 
title to the property is deemed to be under and by the authority of the person establishing legal 
title, unless the person occupying the property can show that she has occupied the property for at 
least seven years and that during that seven year period, she has paid all of the taxes levied and 
assessed against the property. Unless you find that Elaine Jenkins has paid all of the real 
property taxes assessed against the property for seven consecutive years, and that such payment 
was not paid to the property owner as partial rent or consideration for the right to use of the 
property under a rental agreement, you must find in favor of Alan Jenkins. 
U.C.A. 78-12-7 
U.C.A. 78-12-12 
Grayson Roper Limited Partnership v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989) 
Keller v. Chournos. 102 Utah 535, 133 P.2d 318 (1943) 
Home Owners' Loan Corp. v. Dudley, 105 Utah 208, 141 P.2d 160 (1943) 
Jury Instruction No. 
When a person, by her acts or conduct, voluntarily causes another to believe in the 
existence of a certain state of things, and thereby induces him to act on that belief so as to 
change his previous condition, the person inducing such belief will be estopped from afterwards 
denying the existence of such state of things, to the prejudice of the person so acting. 
Jury Instruction No. 
In order to find that Elaine Jenkins performed or partially performed an agreement 
whereby she would obtain title to the real property in question, even though there is no written 
document evidencing such an agreement, you must find that the owner of the property agreed 
that upon the performance of certain actions, the property would be transferred to her; that there 
was a meeting of the minds between the owner of the property and Elaine Jenkins as to what 
those certain actions were that she was to perform and that she did in fact perform those actions 
Jury Instruction No. 
A party cannot adopt a position in a subsequent lawsuit contrary to a position ruled upon 
by the court in a previous lawsuit. If you find that in Elaine Jenkins' previous divorce action, 
she took the position that she did not own the property in question and that the court ruled in a 
final judgment that she did not own the property, then you must find against her on the claim 
she now makes in this lawsuit that she does own the property. 
Macris & Associates, Inc. v. Newavs, Inc., 2000 Utah 93, 16 P.3d 1214, 
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